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The Need Not To Believe: Freud's Godlessness Reconsidered
In considering Sigmund Freud's identity as a Jewish man of the 19 th and 20 th centuries I (Richards, 2008) have argued that one must consider three distinct strands. The first of these strands, and the subject of numerous studies both within psychoanalysis and without, is Freud's commitment to cultural assimilation via a well-rounded classical education and participation in the wider world of European science and letters-to wit, the tradition of Bildung as an educational, moral, and assimilationist ideal, one shared by many of Freud's Jewish contemporaries (Richards, 2006) . This assimilationist strand was not without its ambivalent underside for Freud and for many of his Jewish contemporaries. In terms of Freud's own biography, this strand begins quite early in Freud's life, literally in his seventh year when his father began schooling him in that great Englightenment and assimilationist text, The Phillipson Bible, and it can be charted as a major theme in his identity throughout his adolescence and adult years. The second strand in Freud's identity derives from his response to antisemitism, which first became widespread, and virulent, in Vienna from 1881 onward. Freud's response was always one of defiance, but its particulars evolved over the course of his adult life with the development of psychoanalysis and with the subsequent evolution of the psychoanalytic movement. I cannot chart all its nuances here, but I should note that Freud's response entailed a heightened sense of himself as a Jew combined with an enduring sense that the Jewish tradition is favorable to the development of intellectuality generally, and of a scientific worldview particularly. Also to be noted is that at the end of his life, Freud finally offered his own analysis of the psychological nature of antisemitism in his book Moses and Monotheism (1939) . 2 In this paper, I want to consider the third crucial strand in Freud's Jewish identity-his utter, militant Godlessness. Let us be clear at the outset what is at stake here. To be an unbelieving Jew, a Gottloser Jude, was nothing exceptional, neither in the later decades of the 19 th century nor in the first decades of the 20th. Indeed, it was commonplace and had been since the Haskalah first spread among the Jews of Europe. Nor was godlessness anything German
Gentiles considered particularly striking among their own. Freud could have been offhanded about his disbelief. As he did with his adherence to telepathy, he could have treated it as "my private affair, like my Jewishness, my passion for smoking, or other things" (Gay, 1987, p. 148) .
He could have worn his disbelief lightly, and treated religion with simple indifference as fellow analysts like Karl Abraham, Sandor Ferenenczi, and Isidor Sadger did. He could have contented himself with indirection, with a critique of its forms, with suggestions that the father god took on the qualities of the father of childhood, and let it go at that.
Instead, he went out of his way to make religion and belief a target of the new "metapsychology" of psychoanalysis and he kept up the barrage throughout his later career, seemingly as a point of honor. The first real shot came in 1908, with the summary judgment in "Obsessive Actions and Religious Rituals" that religion was "a universal obsessional neurosis" (1908, S.E. 9: 126-127) with the chief difference between it and ordinary neuroses being that the instincts suppressed beneath religious practices are the egoistic and antisocial ones. The paper attacked ritual, which Freud was notoriously opposed to in his personal life, as well as belief.
Judaism is perhaps more of a target than Christianity in this paper, though both, along with
Islam, are implicated.
But that paper was as nothing compared to the salvo of Totem and Taboo (1913) was not our desire to interfere with their more distant worldview and religion, but we considered ours to be quite favorable for conducting science" (Brabent et al., 1993, pp. 490-491) . In 1930, in a preface for a new translation of Totem and Taboo into Hebrew, Freud added a universalist disclaimer while striking the same note: "it adopts no Jewish standpoint and makes no exceptions in favour of Jewry. The author hopes, however, that he will be at one with his readers in the conviction that unprejudiced science cannot remain a stranger to the spirit of the new Jewry" (1913 [1930] , S.E. 13: p. xv).
By the time of the preface for the Hebrew edition of Totem and Taboo, Freud had already had gone into print with the Future of an Illusion (1926) . One has to consult this book anew, and compare it to Freud's other works stylistically, to appreciate how bald an attack it is, how lacking in the usual graces of Freud's prose, how fiercely intent it is on hammering home its point.
Robert Paul (1994, p. 836) and conflict embedded in the individual personality structure. Freud is no exception and his religious thinking unveils these inner conflicts and unresolved ambivalences more tellingly than any other aspect of his work. (Meissner, 1984, p. vii). 6 But how do we decode Freud's "argument about religion" in terms of his "unresolved ambivalences"? Where do we discover the "shadow of the child" in Meissner's terms? Where do we discover the equivalent of a "former Yeshiva student in revolt against Judaism" in Yerushalmi's? Let's begin with where we don't find it-in Freud's childhood. It may be there, but in terms of the historical record, the cupboard is almost totally bare. We basically don't find
God at all. True there was the Christian nurse till age 2 ½ who filled the boy with ideas of the hereafter, but efforts to pursue this early connection into Freud's adult life-such as those of Paul Vitz (1988) -must inevitably shipwreck themselves on the factual shoals that Christian themes are eternally, unalterably alien to Freud, not tantalizing, whenever he is later moved to address them. Then there is the single anecdote where his mother tells him as a child that man was made out of earth and would return to earth and then rubbed the palms of her hands together, producing blackened epidermis, to prove it. The feeling the six year old felt was one of mortality-"Thou owest Nature a death" (1900, S.E 4: p. 205)-and one could wonder if that feeling has any connection with the nameless feeling he had of being a Jew that he later wrote about in a letter to the B'nai B'rith on his seventieth birthday-"dark emotional powers all the stronger the less they could be expressed in words" (E. Freud, 1960, p. 367 )-or with the inherited guilt over a primal murder in human prehistory that he posited as the heart of all religious reverence. But as seductive as this invitation to depth psychologizing might be-and great powers of analytic imagination would be needed to explicate it-it is hard to see how it would get us nearer to Freud's "godlessness" as a consciously held, organizing facet of his later years. The next specific evidence of any kind that appears in the historical record comes when Handlin (1951) and Sara Winter (1999) , he makes clear that the concept of Bildung had an expanded meaning for many Jews. This was especially true of the early Jewish analysts; it was their chance to achieve conformity with the cultural mores that would allow them to be integrated into a society and achieve a status that they had historically been excluded from. Yet each adoption of larger European cultural values was also a step away from the Jewish culture of their families. Cuddihy suggests that upwardly mobile urban Jews of the nineteenth century felt embarrassment toward their provincial parents, and "guilt for being thus ashamed" (p. 58).
Certainly, this kind of ambivalence can be seen clearly in the coat of Freud's identity. Though
Freud emphasized his humanistic education, he persistently minimized his knowledge of Jewish subjects, including Hebrew and Yiddish. It is customary here to cite as typical his disclaimer to A. A. Roback in a letter of 1930: "My education was so unJewish that today I cannot even read your dedication, which is evidently written in Hebrew. In later life I have often regretted this lack in my education" (E. Freud, Ed., 1960, p. 395) . And this kind of disclaimer can be dated back as far as the Interpretation of Dreams: In his analysis of "My Son the Myops" dream in
The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud struggles out loud with the Hebrew word geseres:
"According to information I have received from philologists, 'Geseres' is a genuine Hebrew word derived from a verb 'goiser', and is best translated by 'imposed suferings' or 'doom.' The use of the term in slang would incline one to suppose that it meant 'weeping and wailing'" (1900, S.E. 5: p. 442). As though he did not quite know what geseres meant on his own, either in Hebrew or in Yiddish ("slang" or, more resonantly in German, "jargon"). Hoffman, Jakob had become a Maskil, an enlightened Jew, more in sympathy with the German Jewish Reform movement than with traditional rabbinical Judaism (see Krull, 1979) . In 1855, the year that he married Amalie Nathanson, his second or third wife, Jakob began to wear Western dress. By that time, he was already speaking and signing documents in German rather than Hebrew or Yiddish. Still, he continued to read the Talmud-if not study it-as well as the
Bible. (His son Sigmund would later acquire two copies of an edition of the Talmud in German,
Hebrew, and Aramaic published in 1929.) Whatever ambivalence the father felt about his own escape from his father's milieu would have informed his instruction of his son. And to be noted is that sometime in the last two years of Gymnasium as he prepared to step forward to the University of Vienna, Freud altered his name, dropping "Schlomo," which had been his 11 grandfather's name, and changing "Sigismund," which had lately become a favorite name in antisemitic jokes, to "Sigmund." The paradox of the free-thinking Jakob's course in life was that while he could, and did, recite the entire Seder service from memory, he had raised a son who at the age of 18 would cheerfully write his friend Silberstein that he could scarcely tell the Holidays apart were it not for their differing dinner menus! Eventually, late in the day, Jakob did something about this state of affairs. In 1891, Jakob retrieved the Phillipson Bible that he had tutored the young boy on, had it rebound in new leather, and gave it to his son on the occasion of the latter's thirty-fifth birthday. Here let us note that in 1891 we are well into Freud's adult life.
By this time, Sigmund had been in practice for five years-he had opened his office on Easter Sunday, making a point of his own-and had been married for four and a half. He had married into the Jewish intellectual and religious aristocracy of the Bernays family, but had lobbied insistently with his fiancée against her religious observances. Indeed, he did not want to stand beneath the Chuppa at the wedding, enough so that he created a small tempest by insisting on a civil marriage in Germany. But the union was not legally recognized in Catholic Vienna, so a second marriage had to be performed. Freud even considered conversion just to escape the ceremony. He capitulated finally under the friendly advice of his mentor and patron, Josef
Breuer, who counseled simply that it would all be "too complicated." Peter Gay (1988, p. 54) describes the denouement thus: "And so on September 14, Freud, the sworn enemy of all ritual and all religion, was compelled to recite the Hebrew responses he had quickly memorized to stamp his marriage valid." Freud promptly "got his revenge or, at least, his way," Gay adds, by not allowing Martha to light the candles on the first Friday evening after the marriage, "one of the more upsetting experiences of her life" (p. 54) Now, some four and a half years after that night, the father makes a present to the son-the Phillipson Bible, which presumably Freud had Jews were 9% of the total population of the city, but they formed about 19% of the population of the first district (the inner city), 36% of the population of the second district (the Leopoldstadt), known affectionately as "Die Mazzesinsel," the island of Mazzah), and 18% of the ninth district (the Alsergrund), where Freud lived his adult life on 14 Berggasse 19, around the corner from Theodor Herzl). Within these districts, which were adjacent to each other, Jews also concentrated in certain areas, so that some parts of the city were-or at least seemed-almost wholly Jewish. While there were some distinctions based on wealth within this Jewish concentration, in general rich and poor Jews lived together in the same neighborhoods, with the richer Jews in nicer apartment houses on the main thoroughfares, and poorer Jews in shabbier buildings on the smaller side streets.
[pp. 14-15]
Freud lived in both kinds of buildings, nice and shabby, during the course of his growing up.
Moreover, even when he had finally settled in Berggasse 19, he was still in the ninth district around the corner, figuratively and literally, from his co-religionists. And let us bear in mind that the Jews of Vienna, despite the success of some, were still in the main poor; some two thirds could not afford to pay the synagogue tax in the year 1900 according to Rozenblit; these Jews would have been closer than not to where the Freud family resided regardless of Jakob's fortunes year to year, or how his son's career progressed in the years following his marriage.
Shame about the father may have been difficult to separate from shame about the milieu. We have several anecdotes pertaining to the latter. When Freud was twenty-seven, he was sufficiently chagrined at the behavior of his friend Nathan Weiss that he spoke of him to his important new acquaintance and fellow Jew, Josef Breuer. Weiss's subsequent suicide following a disastrous marriage, which Weiss had forced against all friendly advice including Freud's own, then led to an ugly scene at the funeral as the presiding lecturer blamed the girl and her family for the death. "And all this he spoke with the powerful voice of the fanatic, with the ardor of the savage, merciless Jew," Freud wrote at the time to his fiancée Martha Bernays, "We were all petrified with horror and shame in the presence of the Christians who were among us" (E.
15 Freud, 1960, p. 65) . The milieu, and his father, continued to haunt Freud. In 1904, he had a disturbance in his sense of reality during a visit to the Acropolis with his brother Alexander.
Much later in life he analyzed it (1936, S.E. 22: pp. 246-247) in terms of a feeling that "We really have gone a long way!" which he contrasted with the "the poverty of our conditions of life in my youth," while adding: "It seems as though the essence of success was to have got further than one's father, and as though to excel one's father was still something forbidden."
As to where Freud's own sense of identity stood roughly at the time of the visit to the Acropolis, we have a telling version of the same theme of social shame from the account of a Dr. M. Judaism and the Jews irresistible, many dark emotional powers all the stronger the less they could be expressed in words, as well as the clear consciousness of an inner identity, the familiarity of the same psychological structure…. Because I was a Jew I found myself free of many prejudices that restrict others in the use of the intellect; as a Jew I was prepared to be in the opposition and to renounce agreement with the 'compact majority" (E. Freud, 1960, pp. 366-367) .
Grinwald. Grinwald was a religious
At the age of 70 to an interviewer: "My language is German. My culture, my attainments, are
German. I considered myself German intellectually, until I noticed the growth of anti-Semitic prejudice in Germany and German Austria. Since that time, I prefer to call myself a Jew" (cited in Gay, 1987, p. 139) .
These are all the sentiments of an adult, an adult whose conflicts have been decided for him by events, whose ambivalence has been reshaped as to its target. In short, I think that the root source of the intensity of his contempt for religion is not to be found in his childhood and not in his personal-psychological history, but after adolescence in his social-psychological history.
That is, I think buried within Freud's attitude is his selective sense of shame, humiliation, and sheer frustration with his co-religionists insofar as they maintain the old religion, the old rituals, the old ways. That is their madness, that is what keeps them still tied to their Shtetl backgrounds and keeps them as the obvious targets of antisemitic prejudice. But all this is going unsaid. As against this root, the more obvious motive of undercutting Christian belief, which motive can be and is shared with psychoanalytic colleagues, is altogether less important, though it is there. In this vein, let us look again at the psychological structure that Freud finds at the heart of conscience and at the heart of a belief in a father god: inherited guilt over an inherited murder. Judaism, on godlessness and on the "many dark powers all the stronger the less they could be expressed in words" (E. Freud, 1960, p. 367) . We come to the place where the three trends in
Freud's Jewish identity intertwine at last-and, arguably, we also get his final socio-cultural view of his own science. His acceptance of being a Jew is embedded in the whole notion that the Jews have a special shared phylogenetic heritage. It is a racial view. His own identity as a cosmopolitan assimilated Jew is spoken for in the claim that the Jews have inherited a special intellectuality. Godlessness is here, too, of course. The belief in the father god is an inherited truth only in the sense that it recalls the primeval event of parricide, which it otherwise misinterprets. Science, the rhetorical lynchpin of his godlessness, is obviously spoken for in the very endeavor, for it is the application of the new branch of science, psychoanalysis, which enables Freud to justify his "historical novel," and see it as superior to traditional biblical commentary, rabbinical or otherwise. As for antisemitism, it is the very provocation for writing Freud, the Jewish tradition is at last becoming fully self conscious, via psychoanalysis, and through it so is mankind. The will not to believe, I think, stems from the same psychological sources as the will to believe-not so much from personal roots deep in childhood, though these may be important, but from feelings of social solidarity that need to find expression in a worldview that offers a positive program, a sense of meaning and forward direction, a vision of purposefulness in a terminally uncertain world.
Where does this leave psychoanalysis, finally, and where does it leave us? Religion is based on fear. Psychoanalysis helps mankind overcome fear. The rest is commentary. 
